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ABSTRACT 
Chinese economic penetration of Latin America has profoundly altered the economic and 
political relationships in the region. This thesis argues that while the growing relationship 
between China and Brazil has been beneficial for both countries, it is especially 
beneficial for China. While the Brazilian raw materials and agricultural industries have 
profited, the influx of finished Chinese products is making many Brazilian industries, 
especially textiles, uneconomical, and has raised fears that Brazil may contract the 
“Dutch disease”—reliance on a few industries for export income. However, China has 
offset the historic political influence of the United States in the region, and holds out the 
prospect of being a strong sponsor of Brazil’s ambitions to become an international 
political player commensurate with its growing regional economic and political 
importance. Latin American states are finding various ways to expand lines of 
communication and to collaborate with the Chinese, who are clearly set to play a major 
role in aid-giving worldwide. We must better understand our future competitor in order to 
develop our own strategy for engagement in Latin America. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
In the last few decades, the world has experienced a major alteration of old 
production relations and, consequently, of political ties. Free trade agreements and 
bilateral pacts dominate the new global economy characterized by increased connectivity 
and interaction among the market’s diverse stakeholders. This integration of the markets 
has immensely benefited some countries while adversely affecting others.1 The adoption 
of the free trade regimes by some of the developing countries in the past few decades has 
resulted in unprecedented economic growth in these countries. It has also led to a decline 
of the dependence of these countries on previous market relationships and on 
international institutions like the IMF and the WTO.  
In the last decade, the People’s Republic of China has witnessed explosive 
growth.  By offering tremendous production capacity at the most advantageous costs, 
Beijing has led the country on a fast-paced growth trajectory that has attracted the 
attention of many of the developing countries while threatening the market dominance of 
a number of economic superpowers.2 For years, China has remained closed to the outside 
world. Many of the more advanced countries have expressed their desire for free trade 
with China as it promised a huge market for their domestic goods. In the last two 
decades, China adopted the policy of liberalization and soon became one of the biggest 
exporters of manufactured goods. This tremendous growth has provoked a mixed 
reaction. For developing countries, China provided a model of opportunity and hope. The 
tremendous demand for raw materials by Chinese industries helped the export of raw 
materials in these countries. On the other hand, the domestic products of the developing 
nations had to compete with Chinese goods whose cost was kept artificially low by an 
undervalued Renminbi. As a result, Chinese growth had dual impacts on the developing 
                                                 
1  Rex A. Hudson, comp., Brazil: A country Study (Washington, DC: GPO for the Library of Congress, 
1997). 
2  Daniel P. Erikson, “‘The New Challenge’: China and the Western Hemisphere,” (Testimony before 
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, June 11, 2011). 
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countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In recent times, China has also made efforts 
to balance its trade with different countries. 3 
Recently, the Chinese government has sought a closer trade relationship with 
Latin American countries, with the goal of resource extraction, especially oil. Some Latin 
American countries have significant reserves of oil, especially Mexico, Venezuela and 
Brazil. Therefore, these countries can play an important role in the development of 
emerging countries like China and India. Chinese interests are also focused on Latin 
American agricultural products and mined resources as well as chemical and 
infrastructure-related goods. Despite this primary product extraction, China continues to 
run a trade surplus with Latin American countries.  
Since 2009, the significance of trade between the China and the Latin American 
countries has risen significantly to almost $100 billion and growing. The value of China’s 
trade with Latin American countries is estimated to account for five percent of the total 
value of global trade;4 but further development of free trade is being negotiated between 
China and Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica. In 2010, the value of trade between Brazil and 
China was as high as $62.5 billion, an increase of 47.5 percent from the previous year’s 
value of exports. China had a deficit of trade with Brazil to the tune of $20.28 billion in 
2010.5 The major items of export from Brazil to China are iron ore, soybeans, sugar and 
aircraft.  China provides the second highest export market for Peru, Argentina and Cuba. 
Similarly, the Latin American economy provides a huge market for many kinds of 
Chinese goods. Electronic goods, machineries, textiles, and shoes of Chinese origin have 
a high demand in Latin American markets.  Chinese officials project that trade with Latin 
America will be over $100 billion for the next five years.  The cost advantages and the 
rich endowment of natural resources in many of the Latin American countries provide 
huge opportunities for investment by Chinese companies. It also provides a chance for 
                                                 
3  Michael Cerna, “China’s Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for US and Chinese 
Presence in the Region,” China Currents, 10(2011): 1, accessed on June 20, 2011. 
http://www.chinacurrents.com/Vol10_No1_2011/cc_cerna.htm. 
4  Ding Qingfen, “More Trade Pursued With Latin America,” China Daily USA, May 17, 2011, 
accessed on June 20, 2011. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/epaper/2011-05/17/content_12524275.htm. 
5  Ibid. 
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rapid expansion in these countries. As a result, Latin American countries have provided a 
lucrative destination for investment by Chinese companies. By 2009, investments by 
these companies in Latin America had touched $30.6 billion. It comprises about 12.5 
percent of the countries’ investment outside their own boundaries. The biggest 
destinations for Chinese investment in Latin America are the countries with sound 
economic performances, like Brazil and Peru. The other major countries are Venezuela, 
Mexico and Argentina. Latin America is the second biggest region for Chinese 
investment. The major sectors of investment are energy and mining. Due to the mutually 
beneficial effect on the respective economies created by the increase in trade, it can be 
expected that more and more development of multilateral economic ties will occur 
between China and the Latin American economies. 6 
 
                                                 
6  Ibid. 
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II. BIRTH OF THE CHINESE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION 
A. GENESIS OF CHINA’S ECONOMIC MIRACLE 
In the last three decades, the Chinese economy grew 20 percent annually. The 
total trade of the country amounted to $2.56 trillion in 2008, $1.43 trillion in exports   
with $1.13 trillion in imports. The following diagram shows the sector-wise composition 
of Chinese trade.  
The Figure 1 shows that the manufacturing sector is China’s  leading export 
sector. The country is heavily dpendendent on the import of agricultural products,  fuel, 
and mining goods. 7  
 
Figure 1.   China Trading Structure: Consumption and Regions, 2008.  
(From Mingramm et al., 2009) 
 
                                                 
7  Rafael Mingramm, Ke Wang, Antonio Jimenez, and Jesus Reyes, “China- Latin America 
Commodity Trade and Investment: Enduring Trends towards 2027,” (Nov 2009) accessed on June 3, 2011, 
1–17.  http://www.sinolatincapital.cn/Upload/20091123103159.pdf. 
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Figure 2 represents Chinese exports by country. China exports 20 percent of its 
goods to European Union, 18 percent to United States, 8 percent to Japan, 5 percent to 
Latin American countries and the remaining 49 percent to the rest of the world. 8 
 
Figure 2.   Chinese Exports to Different Parts of the World.  
(From Mingramm et al., 2009) 
Figure 3 shows China’s imports by country. It imports 13 percent of the goods 
from Japan, 12 percent of goods and services from European Nations, 10 percent from 
South Korea and imports from Latin America  comprise 6 percent of the total goods and 
services imported by China. 9 China has shared trade relationships with the Latin 
American countries for a very long time. In recent times, the Sino-Latin American 
relationsips have gone beyond a trade relationship to a strategic partnership in various 
domains. 
 
                                                 
8  Ibid.  
9  Ibid. 
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Figure 3.   Chinese Imports from different Parts of the World.  
(From Mingramm et al., 2009) 
B. CHINESE ECONOMIC POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA, THEN AND 
NOW 
Beginning in 1978, the Chinese economy underwent considerable structural and 
institutional reformation from time to time. The success attained through this 
restructuring process is evident from the high growth rate of the country and the 
consequent gain in recognition on the international political platform. China’s rise to 
political and economic prominence has been observed with caution by some of the 
advanced countries, while it has inspired many emerging countries. The country’s high 
growth rate has not only transformed the poor Chinese economy of the 1960s into a 
booming economy with a highly productive export market, but it also demonstrates  
growth prospects for many other emerging countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa. 
However, China’s economic growth has come without much change in the political 
structure of the country. China is still led by a single party, and officially it remains a 
communist country. Institutional economists have stressed metamorphosis of the socio-
economic-political institutions and organizations in the reformation process of a country. 
The Chinese government has undertaken considerable institutional reform to promote its 
economic growth.  For over 30 years, the process begun in 1978 has led to a complete 
 8
transformation of the country. The purpose of the reform was, according to Chinese 
Communist Party Leader Deng Xiaoping, to attain socialism marked with Chinese 
character.10 
Under Deng Xiaoping, China embraced a policy of structural reformation.  Deng 
emphasized individual merit over party connections for the economic and social 
development of the person. He also understood the need for Chinese academicians and 
scientists to underpin sustainable growth.  Deng’s ideas were accepted in the Third 
Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of 1978.11China was to 
modernization every sector of the economy. Enhancing economic cooperation with other 
nations was central to Deng’s plan, as was support of scientific and academic research. 
The major focus areas for development were agricultural, industrial, defense, and 
scientific and technological. Plans were laid to relax top-down bureaucratic control and 
other barriers to efficiency. Effort, imagination and ingenuity were to be rewarded.12 
The Chinese economy, prior to the reforms, was characterized by a number of 
problems beginning with industrial bottlenecks caused by underdevelopment  The 
Chinese development model, like that of the Soviets, had underperformed. Most heavy 
industries were owned by the state and absorbed the lion’s share of resources. In 1978, 66 
percent of the state’s net fixed assets were in the manufacturing sector, while only 2.8 
percent were in the agricultural sector. However, 76.3 percent of the country’s population 
worked in the agricultural sector.13 As a result of this huge imbalance, the industrial 
sector often faced slowdowns due to lack of growth in the other sectors. The usual 
remedy in this situation was the diversion of some of the resources in other sectors, 
primarily the light industries.  These solutions, however, were only good for the short 
term.  
                                                 
10  Clem Tisdel, “Economic Reform and Openness in China: China’s Development Policies in the Last 
30 Years” University of Queensland, June 2009, accessed on: June 20, 2011, 1-32. 
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/90624/2/WP%2055.pdf. 
11  Ibid. 
12  Ibid. 
13  James K. Galbraith,  Jaiqing Lu “Sustainable Development and the Open-Door Policy in China” 
(Paper presented at the Council on Foreign Relations, Austin, Texas, May 5, 2000). 
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Table 1 shows after 1978, the agricultural sector was completely revamped. Land 
equipment was reallocated from villages to farmers. This resulted in a considerable 
increase in efficiency. Chinese agricultural reforms and the Household Responsibility 
System increased productivity. Along with opening up the market, this productivity 
resulted in high growth for the primary agricultural sector, almost 126 percent, in the six 
years from 1978 to 1984.  Moreover, this growth resulted in a rise in the contribution of 









131.7 133.9 145.9 158.4 162.7 23.54% 
Industrial 
Output 
326.2 372.8 423.1 459.1 499.2 53.03% 
Output from 
Light Industry 
142.6 163.0 180.6 198.0 234.4 64.37 
Output from 
Heavy Industry 
183.6 209.8 242.5 261.1 264.8 44.23 
Table 1.   Sector-Wise Production in China, 1976 to 1978.  
(From Wei and Chao, 1982)  
China’s leaders also decided to undertake reforms in the light industry sector. 
Special focus was given to the advancement of textile and other light industries to make 
their growth equal to that of the heavy industries. A number of favorable policies were 
announced in energy, transport, credit and foreign currency for import. This boosted the 
infrastructure of the light industries to a large extent.  Moreover, the rigidities of the 
centralized administration system were relaxed. A number of sectors were given 
                                                 
14  Ibid.   
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autonomy or handed over by the state through the transfer of rights to the community or 
through leases to the individual. The policy of promoting efficiency was seen in these 
sectors. There was also an upward revision of prices for many of the price-regulated 
commodities.15  The effects of all these reforms were perceived very quickly. Table 2 
shows tremendous growth was exhibited by some of the sectors like steel, cotton and 
textile as well as agricultural products like peanuts, sesame and rapeseed. 
 





1977 – 80 16.1% 7.1% 11.1% 22.2% 10.3% 
1966 – 76 2.9% -1.2% 1.9% -0.2% 9.4% 
Table 2.   Comparison of Growth of Some of the Products after Reform  
compared to Before Reform. (From Wei and Chao, 1982)  
We can see that there was significant growth in some of the industrial and 
agricultural products after reform. The transport sector experienced huge growth 
including in railways, road and air transport. A larger volume of oil and gas was 
transported through the pipelines which was a result of the increased economic activity. 
There was a substantial rise in the domestic trade. Even international trade doubled from 
1977 to 1980. 16 
Macroeconomic variables also reflected the success of the reform policies in the 
country. The national income grew by almost 50 percent in four years. During 1979 and 
1980, there was a deficit in the country. However, it was accompanied by a growth in the 
investment of capital in the nation. Although it exerted a considerable burden on the 
population in later years, the capital accumulation helped the country to sustain a higher 
                                                 
15  Galbraith & Lu, “Sustainable Development,” 10-12. 
16  Lin Wei, Arnold Chao, eds., “China’s Economic Reforms,” (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 3–7. 
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growth level. There was also a significant impact on the employment of the country’s 
citizens. About twenty-seven million people were employed in the rural and urban sectors 
from 1977 to 1980. There was also a rise in the wages of the workers in the public sector. 
The average increase in wages from 1976 to 1980 was 7.3 percent.  The wage rate in the 
rural sectors also rose significantly during this period, however, the growth in wage rates 
was in nominal terms and the growth in real wages remains unclear. Table 3 exhibits the 
changes in the economy during this period. 17 
 
Variable 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Increase 
in 1980 
over 1976
National Income  
(based on Year’s 
Price) 
242.7 264.4 301.1 335.0 363.0 49.6% 
State Revenue 77.66 87.45 112.11 110.30 106.99 37.8% 
State Expenditure 80.62 84.35 111.09 127.39 119.09 47.7% 
Capital Construction 35.95 36.44 47.9 50.0 53.9 49.9% 
 
Table 3.   Growth of National Income, State Revenue and Expenditure ad  
Capital Construction Investment, 1976–80. (From Wei and Chao, 1982)  
In the above table, we see that the economy experienced considerable growth in 
the four years shown and that development in all areas was significant. The table also 
indicates that there was significant investment for capital accumulation, which helped the 
country to continue the growth rate into the future. Some of the major thrust areas of 
investment were education, scientific research, cultural development, public health and 
 
 
                                                 
17  Ibid. 
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urban infrastructural development. The country obtained significant successes from these 
investments. Enrolment rates in the universities and secondary technical schools doubled 
in the four years from 1976 to 1980.18 
In October 1984, the Chinese government adopted another round of reforms to 
include the enterprise system, supplied materials, laborers and their wages, project 
financing, the prices of commodities, government revenue, tax, expenditures and other 
fiscal policies. The reform process was intended to target multiple issues at the same 
time, instead of sequencing reform. The aim of the government was to overhaul the entire 
economy to make it more competitive compared to the rest of the world and to become 
more competitive in the international market.  The government tried to address the micro 
issues, like the individual enterprises, as well as the macro issues, like tax and fiscal 
control. The primary sector reforms were planned alongside restructuring of the public 
sector enterprises. 19 
The government achieved success in some of the reforms, like restructuring the 
taxes and decentralizing the public sector enterprises. However, some of the reforms did 
not give the results expected. The banking sector, in particular, could not implement the 
credit reforms planned in the face of increased local governance and regionalism.  The 
expenditures of the local governments increased beyond planned levels, which increased 
inflation. 20 
Problems in the restructuring phases prompted the government of China to adopt 
another round of macroeconomic readjustment in 1988. Some of the political events 
during this time became fodder for some anti-reformist leaders of the Chinese 
Communist Party. The widespread inflation contributed to the June 1989 demonstration 
in Tiananmen Square that ended in bloodshed. Some of the public sector enterprises were 
mired in inefficient practices so that a fresh round of reforms had to be initiated in 1992, 
which were directed at transforming the fiscal system, investment policies, foreign capital 
                                                 
18  Ibid. 
19  Galbraith & Lu, “Sustainable Development,” 10-12. 
20  Ibid.  
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policies and the banking sector. The banking sector was modeled on the United States’ 
banking system comprising a central bank and many commercial banks. The People’s 
Bank of China became the central bank. The tax system was streamlined to introduce 
more efficiency into the central and local governments. The central and local taxes were 
separated to make budgetary processes more accountable. In 1994, the country adopted a 
managed floating exchange rate for their currency, which was also made convertible. 
Efficiency was introduced in public sector enterprises. Failed enterprises were merged or 
sold off. The remainder were modernized and brought under a shareholding system. The 
new enterprises were more efficient and did not have the overcapacity of the previous 
public sector enterprises.21 
C. THE EVOLUTION OF CHINESE ECONOMIC POLICY IN LATIN 
AMERICA, THEN AND NOW  
The Sino-Latin American relationship can be traced to the Spanish empire when 
Manila galleons plied the Pacific Ocean between the Philippine Islands, whose external 
trade was dominated by Chinese merchants, and Mexico. Diplomatic relations between 
Latin America and China became tenuous, especially following the 1949 triumph of Mao 
Tse-tung in China.  It was only in the latter half of the twentieth century that the diplomatic 
and commercial ties between China and Latin American countries were renewed and 
strengthened.  From 1990 onwards, the cooperation and collaboration between the two 
countries in terms of politics, economics, science, technology, trade and culture has 
increased. The two regions have often extended mutual support in times of international 
crises.22 In  recent times, China has established a deep bilateral relationship with Brazil, 
and together with India and Russia,  has  created the block of so-called BRIC countries—
Brazil, Russia, India, China. Some experts have seen this Sino-Latin partnership as a 
natural outcome of the similarity in the history of the two regions. In spite of its immense 
growth rate, China is still identified as a developing country that has survived colonial rule. 
                                                 
21  Ibid.  
22 Zhiqun Zhu, China’s New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance, (London: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2010), 79–80. 
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China maintains close strategic relations with many Latin American countries including 
Cuba, with whom it exchanges intelligence and military technology.  
China also has economic interests in Latin America. Latin America’s call to 
establish a nuclear-free continent was supported by Chinese Foreign Minister JiPengfei in 
1972.23 China agreed not to manufacture, transport or store nuclear weapons in the 
region. In October 1952, China signed a bilateral trade agreement with Chile, which was 
the first such agreement between China and any Latin American country. From that time 
onward, Sino-Latin American trade grew progressively. By the year 2000, the two-way 
trade between China and Latin American grew to more than U.S.$12 billion. In the 
1990s, China faced frequent trade deficits with Latin America, which, beginning in 1999 
became a trade surplus of U.S.$2.3 billion. The main export to Latin America was  
manufactured goods like tractors, machine tools, engines, ships and similar items, as well 
as electronics, including TV sets, refrigerators and other household equipment, textiles 
and clothing, medical products,  cosmetics, and light industrial products. China’s five 
largest trading partners in Latin America are Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Panama and 
Mexico, which, together, accounted for three-fourths China’s trade in 1999.24 
1. China and Latin America: 1978 to 1981 
As the Taiwan issue lost its focus and the Three World Theory died after the U.S.’ 
withdrawal from Vietnam, China established a relationship with the United States. The 
Sino-American rapprochement sought, in part, to counter-balance the Soviet threat, as 
well as to isolate Taiwan.   Despite criticism from Latin American leaders like Cuba’s 
Fidel Castro, China continued to court Washington without any regard for the New 
Economic Order. However, several problems surfaced in the Sino-U.S. relationship, so 
that China was forced foster trade relationships partnerships in other regions, including 
                                                 
23  Ibid. 
24  Peter Smith, Kotaro Horisaka and  Shoji Nishijimma, East Asia and Latin America: The Unlikely 
Alliance, (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003). 
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Latin America, where Taiwan was diplomatically active. As a result, China established 
bilateral ties with Ecuador and Colombia in January 1980.25 
2. China and Latin America: 1981 to 1984 
Chinese foreign policy underwent considerable changes beginning in 1981. China 
repositioned its foreign policy to put distance between itself, the United States and the 
Soviet Union, and to form ties with countries of the third world. The then foreign 
minister of China, Huang Hua, led a delegation to Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela. 
Relations were facilitated by the 1980 Treaty of Montevideo that created the Latin 
American Integration Association (ALADI) that incorporated eleven countries. The 
reestablishment of the New Economic Order to create an atmosphere of mutual trust and 
equality was demanded by the Chinese premier.26 There were also demands for support 
to the emerging economies and to promote a North-South discussion. The premier also 
visited Mexico. From 1982 onwards, the focus of Chinese foreign policy was 
simultaneous good relations with the United States and the Soviet Union, and also to 
support and cooperate with Latin American countries, even those not aligned with 
Chinese interests, like Panama, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. China also promoted South-
South cooperation. The interaction between China and Latin America was reinforced 
through diplomatic visits and agreements. The presidents of Brazil, Colombia and other 
countries visited China. Agreements on various issues like sea transportation, economic 
cooperation with Brazil, cultural exchange with Mexico, and on nuclear energy with 
Brazil were reached. The Chinese foreign minister also extended support for the debt 
crisis that was prevalent in Latin American countries.  Antigua and Barbados became 
diplomatic partners. 27, 28 
                                                 
25  Stefanie Reiss, “Discovery of the Terra Incognita: Five Decades of Chinese Foreign Policy 
towards Latin America” (Working Paper, University of Mainz, Germany, October 2000). 
26  Ibid., 31–53. 
27  Ibid. 
28  Galbraith, “Sustainable Development,” 10-12. 
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3. China and Latin America: 1984 to 1988 
Chinese intentions to promote peace were paramount foreign policy 
considerations out of fear that war would disrupt modernization and investment.  This 
concern underwrote the international relations theory of One World that replaced the 
Three World Theory, through which Mao had attempted to balance the interests of China, 
the USSR and the United States. Agendas like mutual support, friendship and joint 
cooperation were promoted. The Chinese prime minister visited many of the Latin 
American countries in 1985 to promote common interests between China and Latin 
America by stressing a common history of colonialism and the experience of oppression, 
as well as the common agendas of developing economies, which required peace. The 
Chinese president promoted the idea of self-determination and independence in the 
respective foreign policies of the countries. The president also condemned the unfair 
burden of the international economic order. According to the president, economic 
development in China would help the country promote global peace. China’s process 
continued with membership in the World Bank and the IMF. The Chinese economy 
opened up to foreign investments. Around this time, some of the Latin American 
countries, especially Brazil and Argentina, tried diversification strategies to fight 
recession. Therefore, the two regions shared complementary economic interests. Joint 
ventures, and trade and investment between the two countries started to grow. By 1987, 
more than ten Chinese companies had invested in eight Latin American countries. There 
were as many as seventeen joint ventures between Chinese and Latin American 
enterprises. The total value of investment was worth over $58 million.29 
According to Table 4, with the exception of 1987, the volume of trade between 
the two regions increased.   The 1987 sudden drop in the trade volume can be explained 
by the sudden rise in the price of crude oil and the recessions that hit Latin America 
during that period. Some political turmoil was also responsible for disturbances in Sino-
Latin trade. 30 
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30  Ibid. 
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Table 4.   Trade Volume in Million Dollars between China and Latin America.  
(From Reiss, 2000) 
4. China and Latin America: 1989 and Beyond 
Since 1989, both China and Taiwan have looked for closer ties with Latin 
America.  On one hand, China was trying to gain multilateral ties with the region to gain 
economically as well as politically. On the other hand, Taiwan tried to strengthen its 
position, internationally, after its membership in the United Nations was cancelled and 
diplomatic ties with the United States were severed. Taiwan followed a policy of 
extending credit and giving monetary aid to poor Latin American countries. China 
strongly condemned this strategy of gaining support through monetary assistance as 
“dollar diplomacy.” However, a similar strategy of extending monetary assistance was 
also followed by China at times. In 1990, China gave loans to seven Latin American and 
Caribbean countries including Jamaica, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Nicaragua and Surinam. 
31 Since 1990, China has advocated all-round exchange and cooperation between the two 
regions. Beijing announced a policy of high level diplomatic communication to promote 
trust.  Development of trade and commerce through the exploration of new avenues was 
called for. There was also a policy for the exchange of science and technology to promote 
mutual economic development. There was to be more cultural exchange between China 
and Latin American countries. The country also promoted the development of the New 
International Economic Order with other Latin American countries. 32 
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After 1989, the Sino-Latin trade volume increased steadily to $6,100 million in 
1995 and $8,370 million in 1997, mainly through Chinese exports.  In 1996 and 1997, 
Chinese exports rose by 24.5 percent while imports rose by a mere 4.4 percent. The major 
items of export were machines and electronic goods.33 The major items of import were 
raw material and other commodities. The major Chinese export markets were Brazil, 
Chile, Peru and Argentina.  The major import items were raw materials like iron, wood, 
soy oil, leather products and wheat. The Chinese and Latin American markets are 
complementary in nature. While the former has a high demand for raw materials, like 
agricultural products and minerals, the latter has a demand for machinery, electronics and 
consumer goods.34 The Chinese demand for food items increased steadily during this 
time in spite of a growth in domestic production. As a result, China was looking to meet 
this requirement for food through imports from Latin American countries. 35 
During this time, a bilateral cooperation between Brazil and China also began, 
marking the beginning of a strategic partnership between the two countries. There was an 
increased exchange of technology. The two countries entered into an agreement to 
develop aerospace technology and launch satellites. One of the reasons behind this joint 
construction was the inspection of the rain forest, as well as exploration of the region for 
new sources of minerals. Brazil also made technological contributions to the first Chinese 
satellite in space. The number of investments and joint ventures between the two 
countries also increased.  There were even communications between the Chinese and 
Latin American entrepreneurs to promote business, including investment, construction 
plans and technical assistance. The current trend of Sino-Latin cooperation seems to have 
had its roots in Chinese foreign and trade policies post -liberalization in 1978.36 
 
 
                                                 
33  Renato Bauman, “Some Recent Features of Brazil-China Economic Relations,” (Paper presented to 
the Economic Commission For Latin America and the Caribbean in April 2009)  9–10. 
34  Ibid. 
35  Reiss, “Discovery of the Terra Incognita,” 31–53. 
36  Ibid.  
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III. EVOLUTION OF BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC POLICY 
A. BEGINNING OF BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
1. Brazilian Economic Development 1950 to 1964  
In the 1950s, the Brazilian government adopted a policy of import substitution 
industrialization to support its manufacturing sector. This required a number of measures, 
including a regime of tariffs and exchange rate controls to protect its nascent industries 
and make the country less dependent on the international market. It also adopted  special 
incentives to attract  direct foreign investments to establish manufacturing industries 
within the territory of Brazil. The companies in the various industries were encouraged to 
assimilate their operations vertically. As a result, there were many domestic supply firms. 
Basic industries like steel manufacturing and public utilities were nationalized to promote 
the growth of other manufacturing industries.37 The oil exploration industry was brought 
under government control with the founding of Petro bras.  Other measures were taken to 
develop and finance the secondary sector of the country through the National 
Development Bank, initially meant to assist the public sector companies and gradually 
extend financial support to private sector industries. The Import Substitution strategy 
helped the development of the Brazilian industrial sector.38 Table 5 illustrates the growth 
of the industrial sector of the country vis-à-vis the agricultural sector.  
                                                 
37 Robert G. Wessen, Politics, Policies and Economic Development in Latin America. (Stanford: 
Hoover Press, 1984), 53–66. 
38  Hudson, “Brazil: A Country Study,” 354-357. 
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Table 5.   Real Growth Rate Industry and Agriculture in Percentages, 1950–1964. 
(From Wessen, 1984) 
Table 5 shows that the growth of the industrial sector has been consistent and, 
except for 1957 and 1963, the industrial sector growth, at 9 percent, has exceeded that of 
the agricultural sector.39 However, this emphasis on industrialization came at the expense 
of under-investment in the agricultural sector.  In spite of the emphasis on industrial 
                                                 
39  Wessen, Politics, Policies, and Development, 53–66. 
YEAR TOTAL INDUSTRY AGRICULTURE 
1950 6.5 11.3 1.5 
1951 5.9 6.4 0.7 
1952 3.7 5.0 9.1 
1953 2.5 8.7 0.2 
1954 10.1 8.7 7.9 
1955 6.9 10.6 7.7 
1956 3.2 6.9 -2.4 
1957 8.1 5.7 9.3 
1958 7.7 16.2 2.0 
1959 5.6 11.9 5.3 
1960 9.7 9.6 4.9 
1961 10.3 10.6 7.6 
1962 5.3 7.8 5.5 
1963 1.5 0.2 1.0 
1964 2.0 5.1 1.3 
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growth, there were no incentives to promote exports. The high exchange rate made the 
export sector less competitive in international markets. Also, there was no effort to 
diversify the basket of export goods in conjunction with the domestic economy. The large 
expenditures to develop the industrial sector and the subsidies paid to the price-controlled 
sector gave rise to inflation, made worse by high government expenditures to create 
capital in Brazil, and the government’s inability to raise revenues. In 1963 and 1964, the 
Cost of Living Index Number was 80.2 overall and 86.6 in Rio de Janeiro. 40 
This strategy also led to the misallocation of resources in various price-controlled 
sectors, and to regional inequalities, as most of the new industries were located in the 
developed parts of the country. However, experts have commented that this regional 
imbalance was unavoidable as Brazil had to take advantage of economies of scale. Many 
public enterprises, already over-populated with employees, were expanded. A population 
growth provoked a rural-to-urban migration into the cities where new industries failed to 
generate enough employment opportunities.  The main beneficiaries of these “reforms” 
were the state-owned banks that flourished with the import substitution industrialization 
policy.41 
2. Consolidation of Previous Growth and the Second Round of 
Expansion (1964 to 1973) 
Until1964, Brazil was in political and economic limbo because the import 
substitution policy produced economic stagnation that contributed to political unrest. The 
military government that assumed power on 13 March 1964 aimed to reverse the effects 
of the import substitution strategy and embark on a path of future growth. The goals of 
the policymakers were to control inflation, remove the market distortions introduced by 
price controls, restructure the capital market to promote savings, and promote private 
investment in the priority sector. Other agendas included attracting foreign investment for 
capital formation and diversifying the export product basket. There were also plans to 
develop infrastructure and heavy industry. The new government imposed strict fiscal and 
                                                 
40  Ibid. 
41  Ibid. 
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monetary control, and raised ceilings on price-controlled products while reigning in 
wages.  Savings were encouraged with the help of indexing.  In this way, government 
deficits could be financed without increasing the inflation rate.  
The regional imbalance problem was addressed with the help of tax and credit 
incentives for investments in the underdeveloped regions, the export sector, the capital 
market, and the tourism sector. A new Housing Bank was established. Workers were 
forced to deposit retirement savings in government banks. Public sector inefficiencies 
were addressed by allowing enterprises to set their own policies for prices, investment, 
and employment.42 The currency was allowed to float.  Various collaborative efforts 
were made with international organizations like the U.S. Agency for International 
Development, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank to finance 
large public projects. 43 
The impact of these well-planned policies was felt within three years. Soon the 
real GDP rose at an average rate of 11.3 percent annually. The secondary sector grew at 
the rate of 12.6 percent. Inflation fell gradually as savings and exports grew substantially. 
Brazil began to export manufactured goods.  
The most notable thing in the Table 6 is that the inflation rate decreased 
progressively after the change of regime, with minor variations, to almost 60 percent 
within four years.44 The policies followed during this period successfully controlled 
inflation while maintaining a high growth rate, to include that in the industrial sector. 
However, during this period, the distribution of income also became highly inequitable. 
Some experts have tried to explain this inequality as the result of a restrictive wage policy 
along with promotion of the capital investment sector and tax incentives, all of which led 
to a high income concentration at the top.45 
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44 Wessen, Politics, Policies, and Development, 53–66. 
45  Hudson, “Brazil: A Country Study,” 381-389.  
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1964 91.9 86.6 87.8 
1965 34.5 45.5 55.4 
1966 38.2 41.2 38.6 
1967 25.0 24.1 28.8 
1968 25.5 24.5 27.8 
1969 20.1 24.5 20.3 
1970 19.3 20.9 18.2 
1971 19.5 20.2 17.3 
1972 15.7 16.4 17.4 
1973 15.5 13.7 20.5 
1974 34.5 27.7 31.5 
Table 6.   Measures of Inflation, 1964–1974. (From Wessen, 1984) 
The Table 7 shows that the country’s income distribution worsened between 1960 
and 1970. During this period, the emphasis was on market expansion, but the autonomy 
of the public sector enterprises, as well as the funds made available to them through the 
worker security fund, also boosted the growth of the state-owned enterprises. The tax 
base was also increased with the help of proactive government measures The 
authoritarian government could easily make certain changes, like offering tax incentives, 
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GROUP Income Holding in 1960 Income Holding in 1970 
Lowest 40% 11.2   9.0 
Next 40% 34.3 27.8 
Next 15% 27.0 27.0 
Top 5% 27.4 36.3 
Total 100 100 
Table 7.   Comparison of the Income Distribution of Brazil between 1960 and 1970 in 
Percentages. (From Wessen, 1984) 
3. Growth of Brazil (1974 to 1983) 
The early 1970s were characterized by the oil crisis and fear that world had 
reached peak oil production. This, together with high income inequality, was the biggest 
challenge that the new president of Brazil, General Ernesto Geisel, faced after his 
accession to power in March 1974.47 The president had to achieve these goals while 
maintaining the previous administration’s high growth rate, in large part because the task 
of redistribution becomes easier when a country is experiencing growth.48 Although the 
price of petroleum remained high in the international market during this period, the 
Brazilian government did not want to neglect the secondary sector or mining by focusing 
too much investment into petroleum extraction. Brazil had successfully accumulated 
large savings and also had a considerable foreign currency reserve as a result of its 
diversified exports. But they still could not meet the expenditures for large amounts of 
imports from the United States, which amounted to $6.2 billion in 1973 and $12.6 billion 
in 1974. As a result, the country had to borrow on the international market. The 
government was also committed to the growth of real wages and increasing the standard 
of living for the average citizen.  Therefore, real wages rose steadily during this period. 
But rising wages and the rise in petroleum prices led to an increase in the cost of 
production, which forced firms to raise prices. 49 
                                                 
47  Bauman, Renato. “The Geography of Brazilian External Trade: Right Option for a BRIC?,” 
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48 Wessen, Politics, Policies, and Development, 53–72. 
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Brazil’s growth rate during this period was quite high, although it fell short of 
former growth levels. One of the features of the growth rate during this period was that it 
was achieved without any transfer of real resources to the international market although 
petroleum prices rose, petroleum production was financed primarily through foreign 
loans. As a result, the burden of the price rise was transferred to future generations, rather 
than being faced by the current generation.  In 1980, inflation reached a spectacular 110 
percent. The large foreign debt and the high interest rates at that time made for a crushing 
debt-servicing burden. 50 
 




1972 11.7 13.4 4.0 16.8 14.0 
1973 14.0 16.0 3.6 16.2 13. 
1974 9.5 9.1 8.2 33.8 33.8 
1975 5.6 5.6 5.2 30.1 31.2 
1976 9.7 12.5 2.9 48.2 44.8 
1977 5.4 3.9 11.8 38.6 43.1 
1978 4.8 7.4 -2.6 40.5 38.7 
1979 6.8 6.6 5.0 76.8 76.0 
1980 7.9 7.9 6.3 110.2 86.3 
1981 -1.9 -5.4 6.8 95.2 100.6 
1982 1.0 1.0 -2.5 99.7 101.8 
Table 8.   Real Growth and Rate of Inflation in Percentages, 1972–1982. 
(From Wessen, 1984) 
The burden of foreign debt and inflation became unsustainable for Brazil. Also, 
global pressures forced the government to remove the export and credit subsidies that 
underpinned the country’s export industries. To maintain the volume of exports, Brazil 
devalued the real.  Overvalued currency had not been a problem pre-1979 because of the 
tax and credit incentives provided to the exporters.51 But the devaluation unfavorably 
affected firms with high foreign debt. The global recession during this period hampered 
the expansion of the export industry. As a result, the government was forced to 
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renegotiate its debt payments with the IMF and other creditors. As a condition of 
renegotiation, the government had to undertake several austerity measures, in particular, 
it had to reduce investment and take currency devaluation measures to repair the deficit in 
the balance of payment and the debt burden. They also enforced severe austerity on the 
citizens.  Not surprisingly, after 1981, the growth rate gradually decreased and 
unemployment rose, which led to protests and demands for sociopolitical reform. 52 
B. BRAZIL AS AN EMERGING MARKET  
Brazil boasts the largest economy in Latin America. The country has the highest 
gross domestic product per capita and extensive international trade relationships. Brazil’s 
growth potential makes it one of the world’s most dynamic emerging economies. Brazil 
is home to a number of multinational companies. The Brazilian economy has profited 
enormously from its trade with China, a market that has grown at the highest rate.  For 
instance, between 2002 and 2003, the Brazil’s exports to China have increased by almost 
80 percent. In 2007, Brazilian exports to China accounted for 6.2 percent of total 
Brazilian exports. The major export items have been agricultural products like soybeans 
and soy oils, minerals like iron ore and steel, and forestry products like timber. Five of 
these products accounted for 75 percent of the country’s exports to China in 2006. 
However, the upsurge in exports also exposed the domestic market to Chinese 
competition. Brazilian trade with China has increased its production specialization. 
However, chances that over-specialization will lead to dependency on other countries 
have raised concerns for Brazil’s economy and growth.  53 
Experts and analysts have voiced concerns about the Brazilian economy catching 
the so-called “Dutch disease”—a syndrome by which the exports of a country are 
comprised of only one or a handful of goods, in which case, the manufacturing industry 
begins to lose their relevance in the export market. Brazil’s success has been possible 
partly because of a rise in the volume of their exports, but mostly because of a rise in the 
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price of exported goods.  The sectors that have achieved maximum growth in the export 
market do not account for more than 20 percent of the export income share. Moreover, 
the major items of export are not commodities. The textile industries of the country have 
fared well in the face of stiff competition from their counterparts in India and China. The 
exports of raw materials from the primary sector as well as minerals and ores have 
increased along with the higher value-added sectors.  The country has successfully 
developed its manufacturing industries. In 2006, the Brazilian aircraft manufacturing 
company, Embraer, captured a large contract to sell 100 jets to China. The major 
competition faced by Brazil is from China. The low technology industries of the country 
and perhaps the automobile industry of the future are especially threatened by this 
competition. 54 
Experts believe that the Brazilian demand and supply for the agricultural goods 
basket and the Chinese demand and supply for agricultural goods complement each 
other.55 Therefore, the two countries can benefit from bilateral trade and mutual 
investment. One of the recurring problems for the Brazilian economy is to keep up the 
type of export with China and the rest of their export market, while at the same time 
avoiding becoming too specialized.  Brazil needs to improve its infrastructure to tackle 
the problem of over-specialization. Currently, the economic system of the country is 
wrestling with inefficiency, the cure for which is innovation and technological progress.  
While Brazil’s research and development is among the best in Latin America, it is far 
below that of the EU, for instance. The majority of R&D is performed in the public 
sector. The good news is that the Brazilian government understands that this must 
change, and that it needs to promote science and technology to increase competitiveness 
in trade. However, it also needs to address the shortage of skills in the labor pool to 
benefit from technological advancement. This will require investment in education, 
infrastructure and technological advancement to sustain economic growth. 56 
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Brazil has become the largest economy in Latin America. The economy of the 
country has also exhibited considerable potential for growth and development. The 
territorial area of Brazil is huge and it also has a vast reserve of natural resources. A large 
portion of these resources are still unexploited, thus increasing the country’s potential for 
long term growth in the future. Brazil has some geographical advantage for trade and 
many foreign companies and multinationals prefer to locate their Latin American 
operations in Brazil. General Motors and Mercedes-Benz have their bases in Brazil.57 
The country has a huge population, which also makes its domestic market an attractive 
target for foreign exports.  Brazil’s income distribution is highly skewed as the poorest 20 
percent hold only 2 percent of the country’s wealth. Most of the foreign investments in 
the country have been targeted on the higher and the middle income groups. This has 
resulted in the highest growth rate in Brazil’s history in spite of periodic incompetent 
economic and monetary strategies and poor governance. The Brazilian population has 
also developed considerably during this period. Because a major proportion of the 
population has been unemployed or underemployed, the tax base has remained small, 
which has affected government revenues available for investment. The high demand for 
education and social services in the country has further burdened the revenue.58 Brazil is 
perceived as a lead nation among Latin American countries. Although there have been 
suspicions regarding the imperialist motives of the country, the general outcome of the 
country in regional development has been positive. Brazil’s inability to reach U.S. levels 
of regional dominance have been attributed to its dependency on outside exports and poor 
economic management, which have led to inflation.59 
Brazil’s current growth rate has been supported by a set of well-designed 
economic and social policies. The rate of unemployment on April 6, 2011 was 6.4 
percent, one of the lowest in the history of the country. The problem of inequitable 
income distribution has decreased greatly. Brazil’s different markets have exhibited a 
healthy performance, including the credit market. In the past decade, the country has 
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exhibited exemplary stability in its policies. Brazil has also faced the financial crisis and 
the problem of foreign capital inflow and managed to survive without much damage. 
However, the inflation rate of the country is moderately high at 6.5 percent. Inflation has 
been driven by fuel and material costs, but pressure for higher wages may further deepen 
the problem. Moreover, the demand for higher wages may introduce wage rigidities in 
the country and, thereby, make it a less attractive destination for foreign investors.  
According to an assessment by the House of Commons of Great Britain, Brazil has 
exhibited a leader’s role among Latin American countries in regional integration and is 
one of the most important members of the Mercosur and well as the Rio Group.60 
C. BRAZIL’S POSITION AS AN EMERGING WORLD ECONOMY 
Different scholars employ different concepts and definitions to explain emerging 
markets. One description of an emerging market is one that has a huge potential to grow 
at a very fast rate, but also has certain political and economic risks attached. In recent 
years, the size of Brazil’s market, combined with natural resources and stable 
governance, has attracted the interests of investors worldwide. However, the Brazilian 
market has a unique dynamic and companies need to formulate their marketing and 
investment strategy accordingly. 61 The Real Plan implemented in July 1993 achieved 
success fulfilling many of its goals. Inflation came down drastically between 1994 and 
1996. The plan also tried to keep the currency stable through a regulated floating 
exchange rate. The country also reaped the benefits of the liberalization policy. The 
healthy macroeconomic policies, along with the liberal trade regime, created a 
transparent and healthy environment for global investors. Operations by international 
auditing firms in Brazilian territory have further facilitated the country’s access to the 
global capital markets. The country’s legal system has also helped the growth of Sao 
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Paulo as the regional financial center.  Brazil ranked fourth among six emerging markets 
in terms of their GDP, as is illustrated by the Table 9.62 
 
Rank Country GDP PPP [Billion Dollar] 
1 The People’s Republic of 
China 
  7046 
2 India 2965 
3 The Russian Federation 2076 
4 Brazil 1838 
5 South Korea 1206 
6 Spain 1362 
7 Mexico 1353 
8 Indonesia 845 
Table 9.   Emerging Markets by GDP [in billions of dollars].  
(From Kvint and L’vovichKvint, 2009) 
On a global level, the country has become a significant player and is perceived as 
one of the most important emerging nations along with Russia, China, India and South 
Africa. The country has voiced its opinions about a number of global issues such as 
global warming and the environmental reforms of the United Nations. Brazil has also 
formed a political alliance with India and South Africa called the G3 or the IBSA. It is 
also a founding member and has an important role among the emerging countries of the 
G20. 63 
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IV. CHINESE TRADE STRATEGY IN BRAZIL 
Economic relations between Brazil and China go back to 1812 when the emperor 
of Brazil brought laborers from China to work in the tea plantations. Since then, the 
migration of Chinese workers to Brazil has occurred at different periods of time, but in 
1949, the wave of Chinese reforms and change of governance led to an interruption of 
ties between the two countries. Relations were renewed in 1974. China’s high economic 
growth rate attracted investments from various parts of the world, including Brazil. The 
relationship between the two countries has developed on a number of fronts including 
economic and strategic partnerships. For Brazil, China’s high growth rate and increasing 
economic and political clout has made Beijing an attractive partner. According to the 
director of the OECD Development Center, Javier Santiso, China is a powerful global 
player that contributes around one-third to the world’s GDP. The spectacular expansion 
of the Chinese economy has also poised challenges for many developing and emerging 
nations.  
When it comes to Latin America, China looks like a “trade angel” who has 
provided Latin America with an outlet for its products.64   Similarly, the Latin American 
countries give China an opportunity to sustain its future growth rate. The markets of the 
United States are growing at a slow pace, especially after the series of recessions that 
began in 2001. In this situation, the untapped markets of the emerging Latin American 
countries present a vast opportunity for Chinese products and investments. Moreover, 
countries like Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela are rich in natural resources including 
agricultural products and fuel. The importation of these resources could solve the 
problem of huge Chinese demand for raw materials. Moreover, countries like Brazil have 
become important members of the global platform through their role in the Mercosur and 
the G20. Joint cooperation in a number of fields was announced after President Lula’s 
visit to China in 2004. 65 Mutual benefits have paved the way for Sino-Brazilian 
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cooperation in a number of fields, including scientific and technological advancement.  
They have also cooperated to gain higher negotiation powers with the more advanced 
countries of the world.   
A. STRATEGY AND FOCUS OF CHINESE INVESTMENT IN LATIN 
AMERICA 
The fast growth of Chinese industries, demonstrated in Figure 4, has led to a rise 
in demand for raw materials in China. The country has the highest consumption of metals 
like copper, tin, zinc, platinum, steel and iron ore, as well as aluminum and lead. China 
has the third highest consumption of nickel in the world.66 Energy is also in high demand 
in China, however, because China has few energy reserves, it has been a net importer of 
fuel since 1993. By 2004, China had the second highest consumption and import of oil, 
after the United States of America. The crude oil import of PRC was 2.6 million barrels 
per day in 2005.  The projected growth of Chinese demand for crude oil over the next 
twenty years is huge—12.8 million barrels per day. The International Energy Agency has 
estimated that the People’s Republic of China will need to import almost 85 percent of 
their crude oil and 50 percent of their natural gas by 2030. Apart from natural resources, 
the Chinese industrial expansion has also produced a huge demand for agricultural 
commodities. The president of the People’s Republic of China, Hu Jintao has decided to 
pursue a more proactive foreign policy through diplomatic ties as well as trade and 
investment, especially with nations rich in resources. Latin America turned out to be one 
of the most logical choices for China to meet its demand for raw materials. 67 
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Figure 4.   Trade Activity Between Latin America and China (After Eisemann, 
Heginbotham and Mitchell, 2007) 
B. CHINESE LIBERALIZATION AND THE GROWTH OF CHINESE 
TRADE WITH THE BRIC COUNTRIES 
China joined the World Trade Organization in December 2001 as a prelude to the 
liberalization of trade and the reduction of import barriers, about the time that the 
government of Brazil also started to focus on foreign trade as a revenue generator.68  
Gradually, the trade relationship between the two emerging market economies has 
developed until, today, it is significant. However, this is hardly exceptional, as trade 
between China and other BRIC countries has also increased during this time. 69 For this 
reason, some Brazilians wonder whether they are not too dependent on China.   
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Table 10 offers some significant insights into the growth of trade between Brazil 
and China. In 2000, the percentage of Brazilian exports to China was only 0.4 percent, 
but it had grown to 6.7 percent by 2007. It also shows that, among the other BRIC 
countries, the bilateral relationship between Brazil and China is most developed. 
Moreover, the share of Brazil’s export to China as a share of Brazilian exports has 
increased four-fold from 2 percent in 1988 to 8 percent in 2008. However, the proportion 
of Brazilian exports on the total Chinese import was a meager 2.6 percent in 2008.  
 





















Brazil - 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1 - 2.3 0.6 6.7 1.1 
Russia 0.3 - 1.0 5.1 0.0 -0.3 - 0.9 4.3 0.0 
India 0.5 2.0 - 3.4 0.7 1.3 0.6 - 6.5 1.5 
China 0.5 0.9 0.6 - 0.4 0.9 2.3 2.0 - 0.6 
South 
Africa 
0.8 0.1 1.4 1.3 - 0.8 0.2 2.1 6.5 - 
Table 10.   A Comparison of the Percentage of other BRICs on total export of the 
respective Countries. (From Eisenman, Heginbotham, and Mitchell, 2007) 
In Table 11, we see that the imports of the BRIC countries from China have 
increased substantially for all the countries. Among them, Brazil’s import of Chinese 
products increased by almost 21 percent during the period. 70 
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Brazil - 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.1 - 1.4 1.8 10.5 0.4 
Russia 1.1 - 1.6 2.8 0.2 2.1 - 0.7 12.2 0.1 
India 0.5 1.0 - 2.6 2.0 0.4 1.2 - 11.2 1.5 
China 0.7 2.6 0.6 - 0.5 1.9 2.1 2.5 - 0.7 
South 
Africa 
1.1 0.3 0.9 3.7 - 2.1 0.7 2.2 10.7 - 
Table 11.   A Comparison of the Percentage of Other BRICs on the Total Imports  
of the Respective Countries. (From Eisenman, Heginbotham, and Mitchell, 2007) 
C. CHINESE TRADE WITH BRAZIL 
The fast pace of Chinese industrialization has led to its huge demand for raw 
materials for the industries in the country. Apart from raw material, the country also has a 
demand for agricultural goods. The fast growth of industrial labor and its rise in wages, 
along with the lack of agricultural surplus in the country, has led to this increase in 
demand for agricultural goods. These agricultural goods are required for sustaining the 
country’s fast growth rate. The Chinese demand for agricultural goods can lead to a 
positive impact on Brazil’s agricultural exports, which constitute the most important part 
of the country’s exporting sectors. 71  
Brazil’s imports of Chinese goods vary considerably, but electronic goods, 
machine tools, and manufactured goods are prominent, as well as at least sixteen other 
types of goods. This shows that what the Chinese export to Brazil is more diversified than 
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what Brazil exports to China. Chinese exports are mostly finished or processed goods. 
The Chinese trade policy with Brazil has been successful in penetrating the Brazilian 
market.  We can also infer that while the exported Brazilian products have been mostly 
natural resources, of which Brazil has an abundant supply, the Chinese goods are value-
added finished goods. This has led to the conclusion among many policymakers that 
advent of trade with China will be beneficial for the Brazilian primary sector. However, 
there is concern that it may lead to over-specialization and de-industrialization in 
Brazil.72 
China has traditionally bought a few goods from Brazil that constitute about two-
thirds of Brazil’s total exports to China. These have been soybeans, soy oil, iron ore and 
“pellets and wood pulp.”  Gradually, the proportion of unprocessed goods in the share of 
exported goods has decreased.  The share of semi-manufactured and manufactured goods 
has increased.73 
Table 12 offers some significant insights into the composition Brazil’s export 
basket to China. Though soybeans still remain the main item of exports from Brazil, its 
proportion in the total exported amount has decreased steadily. 74 This does not mean that 
the amount of soybeans exported is decreasing in absolute amounts.  Part of this can be 
explained by the increase in the total volume of exports to China and the increase in the 
amount of other quantities exported to China. Similarly, the proportion of iron ore and 
iron ore pellets has decreased over the years. However, there has been a drastic rise in the 
amount of iron ore and steel products exported from the country. This is a result of the 
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Item of Export 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Soybeans 31.1 28.3 32.7 29.0 
Soybean Oil 2.0 0.3 4.9 5.9 
Iron Ore 16.2 17.9 16.5 11.5 
Iron Ore Pellets 8.8 7.5 7.2 5.4 
Wood Pulp 5.0 6.7 4.5 5.9 
Iron and Steel Products 1.2 1.9 4.4 15.8 
Other Products 35.7 37.4 29.8 26.5 
Table 12.   Main Export as Share of Total Export Percentages to China.  
(From de Paiva Abr eu, 2005) 
1. Trade in Soybeans 
Soybean exports from Brazil increased significantly from 10 percent of the total 
exported goods to China in 1990, to almost 33 percent in 2002. This can be explained by 
the high quality of Brazilian soybeans as well as by the demand for food generated by 
China’s high growth of industries. The growth of soybean imports to China has come at the 
expense of the United States of America. However, in 2003, the United States started 
regaining their market in China. According to estimates, Brazil’s export of soybeans 
increased by 48 percent while United States’ export of soybeans to China increased by 190 
percent. This can be explained by the pressure exerted by United States on China to import 
more soy beans from their country in order to reduce its growing trade deficit with China. 
In 2003, Brazil supplied only 25 percent of the total soybeans imported by China.75 
Brazilian exports of soy oil to China are less significant and more fluctuating than 
that of other countries. The Chinese demand for oil has increased nine-fold between 1992 
and 2004. This can be attributed to the fact that per person consumption of soy oil has 
increased heavily in China. However, there is still a huge potential for the growth of 
Chinese consumption. China’s consumption is only 40 percent of that of both South 
Korea, and Taiwan, however it has been reported that China wants to start domestic 
production of non-genetically modified soybeans in their Northeast provinces. 76 
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2. Trade in Oil  
Brazil in recent times has discovered a vast amount of oil reserves. Some of the 
reserves of Brazil are the Tupi and Jupiter fields. New explorations have also revealed 
large amount of reserves in the Carioca region. The total production from this field will 
help the country to reach production capacity equivalent to some of the OPEC countries. 
Brazil has been a net exporter of oil since 2006. But the major item of petroleum export 
has been crude oil due to the lack of refining capabilities in Brazil. China has formed a 
bilateral agreement with Brazil in order to alleviate its energy problem of the future. One 
of the most renowned Brazilian petroleum companies is the state owned Petro bras.77 
Petrobras has one of the best deep water exploration technologies so that China has 
invested heavily in the company to upgrade the technology. The China Development 
Bank had lent $10 billion to the company in return for guaranteed imports of crude oil for 
the next 10 years. The terms of the contract are that the company will extract 200,000 
barrels of crude oil each day with an increase of 31% each year. Brazil is the tenth most 
important petroleum importing country in China.78 
As noted earlier, China’s appetite for oil is growing exponentially, which makes 
Latin America, generally, and Venezuela and Brazil, in particular, attractive economic 
targets. According to estimates, Latin America has 9.7 percent of the world’s oil reserves. 
The oil production in the region in 2005 was around 13.8 percent of the total output of the 
world. In the Tenth Chinese Five Year Plan, Venezuela was identified as one of the eight 
nations with whom further strategic ties will be fostered. As a result, an energy 
cooperation treaty has been signed and a joint search for oil has been in operation in the 
Venezuelan territories. 
                                                 
77  “Brazil Oil Find May be World’s 3rd Largest,” CBS News, February 11, 2009, Retrieved on July 
14, 2011, from: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/04/14/world/main4013564.shtml 
78  “China, Brazil sign Oil Deal” , People’s Daily Online, May 26, 2010, Retrieved on July 14, 2011. 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90861/7000676.html 
 39
3. Trade in Textiles 
Brazil’s importation of cheap textiles and toys from China has threatened 
employment in these sectors. After 2005, Chinese textiles imported to Brazil started to  
grow significantly. Though a not a very large sector, the Brazilian textile industry is highly 
labor intensive and employs a large section of the population, who have now been displaced 
as a result of this rise in imports. Therefore, there has been a strong demand from the 
representatives of these sectors to impose protective measures on the cheap imported textiles 
from China. As a result, Brazil decided to impose higher tariff duties on textiles imported 
from China. Apart from this, the Mercosur countries also imposed a higher Common 
External Tariff on imported Chinese textiles.79 As a result, the textile manufacturers 
demanded protection for as many as seventy items. This included imposing duties on silk, 
velvet, and polyester items from China. The Brazilian government took up the matter 
seriously and announced that they will impose protective measures to save their domestic 
industries. Finally, in 2006, the two countries reached an agreement where voluntary 
restrictions on the importation of seventy textile products were accepted by China.80 
D. TRENDS IN SINO-BRAZIL TRADE AND THE EMERGING DEBATES 
Brazil initially benefitted from its trade with China. From 1988 to 1995, and 2001 
to 2006, the Brazilian balance of payment with China was in surplus. However, the 
situation has reversed significantly in recent years. The trade surplus China had with 
Brazil doubled from 2007 to 2008. There have also been some changes in the 
composition of the export basket from Brazil to China. Initially, in 1985, steel products 
and vegetable oils comprised almost 61 percent of the total exports from Brazil to China. 
Since 1994, the major item of export was vegetable oils. After 1998, the major items of 
export were mineral products, like iron ore, and farm products. In 2008, the major 
Brazilian exports to China were iron ore, soybeans and vegetable oils. Brazilian items 
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like iron-niobium, orange juice, cast iron, granite and unprocessed tobacco accounted for 
a high proportion of Chinese imports. A close look at Brazil’s exported items shows that 
most of these goods are natural resources and are increasingly concentrated on a few 
items. This gave rise to the fear of the “Dutch disease” in Brazil’s export pattern. 81 
Scrutiny of the exported goods reveals a few facts about the specialization of the 
two countries and their comparative advantages.  First of all, it shows that the overlap in 
the export basket of the two countries is very small. Over the years, the comparative 
advantage of the two countries has diverged, as Table 13 illustrates.82 
Technology 2007 1994 
Low Technology Product 47.17 17.09 
High Technology Product 16.64 -2.98 
Resource based Manufacturing -7.92 -0.79 
Medium Technology Product -8.42 -16.62 
Primary Product -37.49 0.94 
Table 13.   China’s Revealed Comparative Advantage as a Percentage per  
Technological Content. (From Enestor Dos Santos, 2011) 
Table 14 shows that while China has progressively developed its capacity in both 
low and high technology manufacturing goods, Brazil’s predominant exporting sector has 
been primary products. 83 
Technology 2007 1994 




Low Technology Product 5.12 10.17 
High Technology Product -12.40 -4.55 
Medium Technology Product -12.84 -6.25 
Table 14.   Brazil: Revealed Comparative Advantage as a Percentage per  
Technology. (From Enestor Dos Santos, 2011) 
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1. Chinese Investment in Brazil 
China, in recent years, has become one of the top investors globally.  China’s total 
investment in 2006 was assessed at USD 90.6 billion. A large proportion of China’s non-
financial investments have been in Latin American countries, including Brazil. However, 
as a proportion of China’s total FDI Brazil has been a mere one percent of the total 
Chinese investment. The major areas of investment have been the sectors that make 
extensive use of natural resources, as well as the manufacturing sector. The major 
manufacturing sectors that have selected these countries as a destination for their FDI are 
textile, paper, automobile, electronics, IT and telecommunication.  One of the primary 
reasons for Chinese investment is to gain a foothold in the Latin American markets.84 
In 2009, Chinese trade with Brazil surpassed that of the United States, Brazil’s 
former top trading partner. The total trade between the two countries amounted to USD 
36 billion. Brazil also experienced a surplus in its balance of payment, reversing the 
previous two-year trend. There have also been significant investment drives between the 
two countries. The East China Mineral Exploration and Development Bureau invested 
USD 1.2 billion in Brazil’s iron ore mining firm, Itaminas Comercio de Minerios. Firms 
from China have also placed their bid for stakes in Brazil’s offshore oil fields. China lent 
USD 10 billion to the Brazilian oil company, Petrobras. The debt will be repaid through a 
supply of oil to China. The intent of the loan seems to ensure a steady supply of oil in the 
future, rather than helping the country develop infrastructure.  The investment trends 
exhibit that the major sectors of investment have been the fuel and mining sectors. Apart 
from that, the other sectors of investment have been in manufacturing.85 
The China Jialing Industrial Corporation has established a motorcycle 
manufacturing unit and the Huawei Technologies of China have invested in the 
telecommunication sector.  China’s automakers have established their manufacturing 
units in Latin American countries. The primary reasons behind this decision are to exploit 
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the low production costs prevalent in these regions, as well as enter the untapped Latin 
American markets through these production units. The growth of demand in the Chinese 
markets for these manufacturing goods has been slow. Moreover, the large number of 
competitors has reduced the profits of the operating companies. Therefore, these 
companies have tried to venture out into the other parts of the globe and tap into new 
regional markets. 86 
The Latin American markets present a huge potential for these ventures as there 
has been a growth in middle income families in these countries, which will increase 
demand for manufacturing goods in the coming years. Another economic reason behind 
this decision is the cost benefits in these countries. As Chinese firms spread out and start 
their operations from different parts of the world, the cost of establishing and running 
manufacturing units in advanced countries is more than it is in the emerging countries of 
Latin America and Africa. These new manufacturing units also give companies the 
advantage of producing goods near the markets where they are to be sold. A third 
important reason for preferring these countries for establishing factories is to rebuild the 
reputations of the firms.  
Allegations have often been made that these emerging countries are often used by 
firms for dumping the “white goods” or the goods meant for advanced countries. The 
establishment of manufacturing units will help Chinese firms build relationships with the 
locals of the regions as well as correct the people’s image of these firms.87 There are also 
some other advantages, like avoiding local tariffs and taxes. Apart from that, easier 
access to regional markets and a constant interaction with the target customers has 
prompted some firms to establish their manufacturing units in these countries. Hon Hai 
Precision Industry, a company that manufactures for Apple, planned to invest USD 12 
billion in Brazil.88 There are also some other renowned Chinese companies that have  
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started production in Brazilian territory. Lenovo has been producing computer screens in 
Brazil since 2005. Gree, a Chinese air-conditioning manufacturing firm established its 
manufacturing unit there in 2001.  
2. Mergers and Acquisitions 
Apart from investment in the manufacturing unit, the last decade also saw a 
number of merger and acquisition drives among the Chinese and Brazilian firms. Table 
15 gives some such mergers.89 
 
Firm Origin of 
Capital 
Buyer Origin of 
Capital 
Date 
MhagServicos&Meinercao Brazil Noble Group Ltd Hong Kong 07/2007 
UsinaPetribuPaulista Brazil Noble Group Ltd Hong Kong 02/2007 
Bluestar Silicones Brasila 
Ltda 
Brazil China National 
Bluestar Corp. 
China 01/2007 








Neusoft Inc.  China Politec Brazil 07/2006 
BrascabosComponentes Brazil Solartech Intl. 
Holding Ltd. 
Hong Kong 04/2006 
Kasinski Brazil Lifan group China 03/2006 
CVRD-Aqua Limpa Iron 
Complex 
Brazil Shanghai Baosteel 
Corp. 
China 08/2001 
Table 15.   Mergers and Acquisitions between Brazilian and Chinese Firms,  
2001 – 2007. (After Bauman, 2011)  
China also supplies machineries and machine parts to the Brazilian markets. 
Chinese machines have been used in many of Brazil’s steel and cement plants. The steel 
plants have substantially increased the amount of steel Brazil can export. 90 
 
                                                 
89  Bauman, “Some Recent Features of Brazil-China,” 10–12. 
90  Ibid., 3–6. 
 44
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 45
V. CONCLUSION 
China’s invasion of Latin America has had both a positive and a less than positive 
impact on both economic and political levels. For the region in general, China’s 
economic engagement, investments and aid projects in the past decade underline China’s 
intention to increase its presence and influence in the Western Hemisphere.  China’s 
primary goals in Latin America are to gain access to potential markets as well as to 
ensure a sustained supply of reliable resources.91  China’s increased presence in the Latin 
American markets certainly has short-term economic benefits, but China also threatens 
the long-term economic competitiveness of these countries, including Latin America’s 
new leviathan, Brazil. China’s increasingly dominant economic role also threatens to 
alter the region’s historic economic and political relationship with the United States, and 
brings into question the value of Western democracy and its economic models. The Latin 
American countries are important economic partners for China, especially in terms of 
food and energy, and as a buyer of finished Chinese goods, electronics and textiles in 
particular. However, as Table 16 illustrates, those who benefit   most are the exporters of 
primary rather than finished goods.  




















Brazil 2004 1,235,898 54.8 367,485 71.5 868,413 48.6 
 2005 1,481,729 20.0 382,755 31.4 998,974 15.2 
Mexico 2004 711,270 43.9 497,287 52.2 213,982 27.6 
 2005 776,428 9.2 553,827 11.4 222,602 4 
Chile 2004 536,480 51.9 168,852 31.6 367,528 63.5 
 2005 713,440 33.2 214,989 27.3 498,451 35.9 
Argentina 2004 410,723 29.3 85,233 90.6 325,490 19.3 
 2005 512,467 24.8 132,509 55.5 379,958 16.7 
Table 16.   China’s Top Four Trading Partner in Latin America, 2004–2005.  
(From Eisenman, Heginbotham & Mitchell, 2007) 
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A. THE IMPACT OF CHINA’S PENETRATION OF LATIN AMERICAN 
RELATIONS ON THE UNITED STATES 
The CEO of Petrobras, Jose Sergio Gabrielli de Azevado, in an interview, gave 
some insights into future trends and the nature of global trade. He imagines that future 
trade will see a rise in the relevance of emerging nations in global trade, simultaneous 
with a decrease in the dominance of the advanced nations. 92 This is demonstrated in 
Figures 5 and 6. 
 
Figure 5.   U.S. Trade Deficit with China Since 1990. (From Newsweek, 2009) 
                                                 




Figure 6.   Chinese Foreign Asset Growth. (From Newsweek, 2009) 
He also predicted that in the future, the group of G20 countries will achieve more 
prominence in shaping the future of the world than the G8 countries.  An alteration of 
trade patterns will have consequences for global politics and hold serious consequences 
for United States’ trades the world over, but especially in their hemispheric back yard. 
















Figure 7.   GALLUP POLL: Leading Economic Powers in the World Today.  
(From http://www.gallup.com/poll, 2010) 
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Figure 8.   China’s Influence: More Positive than America’s.  
(From http://pewglobal.org, 2011) 
Experts are divided over the potential impact of Latin America’s increasing 
diplomatic and economic ties with China. On one hand, some experts have argued that 
China’s primary intentions in Latin America are purely economic. Other experts are of 
the opinion that Chinese presence may ultimately lead to a threat to the United States. 
Many of them are afraid of the Chinese military and espionage operations out of Cuba. 
Similarly, Brazil’s cooperation with China for launching satellites, and China’s interest in 
the Panama Canal have sparked concerns for the United States. However, others have 
pointed out that China’s interest in the Panama Canal is an obvious one due to the fact  
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that China is the second highest user of the canal.  Beijing asserts that its increasing 
presence in Latin America will have a stabilizing effect as markets develop, which will 
actually help U.S. trade in the region.93 
The United States government has refused to interpret Chinese penetration of 
Latin American countries as a threat. According to U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, Thomas 
Shannon, U.S. military presence in Latin America far exceeds that of China. He also 
agrees that Chinese interest in this region is purely economic.  Chinese officials 
dismissed any suggestions of Beijing trying to introduce a Chinese political model in the 
region.94 Nevertheless, Shannon is concerned that Chinese demand for raw materials will 
one day exhaust the supply of commodities from these countries, which will undoubtedly 
push prices up. In some cases, China has also used its high level of foreign reserves to 
purchase strategic resources and build infrastructure in Latin American countries. 
Moreover, the high volume of Chinese trade sometimes chokes the entry points for 
markets like ports and railways. This, too, has economic consequences for U.S. trade in 
the region.95 
The reduction in the prominence of the USA in Latin American countries was 
highlighted in the suggestions of the CEO of Petrobras regarding the currency of 
exchange. He suggested that in the future, countries can consider trading in their 
domestic currency rather than in dollars. This highlights the diminishing relevance of the 
dollar as a currency of exchange in these countries as well as the growing influence of 
China. It also highlights the trust enjoyed by Chinese currency in the region. However, 
this can have serious ramifications for the dollar. It can also lead to a forced devaluation 
of the dollar on the global platform. Replacement of the dollar by China’s domestic 
currency will also give China an advantage in its trade with Brazil, further distancing the 
USA from Latin American markets.96 
                                                 
93  Barry Leonard, ed., Overview of US policy towards Latin America: Congressional Hearing 
(Darby: Diane Publishing, 2007), 73. 
94  Zhu, China’s New Diplomacy, 106–109. 
95  Leonard, Overview of US Policy, 73. 
96  Newsweek, “Brazil turns East,” 27. 
 51
B. DIRECTION OF SINO-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS 
1. Brazilian Perception of China 
The growth in Sino-Brazilian trade is greeted with different reactions in Brazil, 
depending on the economic sector.  Industries that have lost their market share, like the 
textile industry, 97 are unhappy, while the growth of China’s demand for raw materials 
has heartened the primary goods exporting sectors.  Brazil ran a high trade surplus with 
China until 2003, at a time when exports provided the sole cash flow for raising domestic 
demand. However, since 2004, the importation of manufactured goods from China began 
to increase such that over time, it reduced Brazil’s trade surplus.  The long-term 
economic trends are not good for Brazil who is running a significant trade deficit with 
China. For this reason, the fear is that the volume and low prices of China’s finished 
goods will drive similar Brazilian products out of the market, resulting in Brazil’s so-
called “Dutch disease” infection—an over-specialization of production in a handful of 
commodities. 
For this reason, the textile industry has demanded safeguards against cheap 
imported textiles from China. The leaders of the textile industry have aligned with other 
sectors like machineries, electronic goods and the pharmaceutical industry to demand 
restrictions on Chinese imports. On the other hand, the primary goods manufacturing 
industries have supported increased trade with Brazil. Apart from the domestic market, 
another issue of discontent for Sino-Latin relations has been the loss of third party 
markets in several regions by Brazilian companies. While imports from China account 
for 16 percent of the total United States’ imports, Brazilian imports account for a mere 4 
percent. In 2007 and 2008, 15 out of 19 Brazilian products lost their market share to 
Chinese products. 98 
In recent years, Sino-Brazilian trade has faced a number of problems, beginning 
with safeguard violations to protect consumers and industries imposed by Brazil against 
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Chinese imports.  Between 1992 and 2009, Brazil has questioned the status of forty-three 
Chinese imports, one of the highest numbers for any country. The items cited for 
investigation range from bicycle parts to ironing boards, hair brushes and glasses. All 
these items have been subjected to extra taxes and duties.  A number of antidumping 
investigations have also been conducted against China. Some barriers to free trade have 
also been imposed from the Chinese side. According to the Chinese, imposing 
restrictions, inspections, and duties on Chinese imports can affect the bilateral 
relationship between the two countries and thereby hamper Brazilian exports.  
China has not taken this lying down: after an outbreak of hoof and mouth disease, 
imports of meat from Brazil were barred. 99  In 2002, the Chinese refused a shipment of 
Brazilian soybeans, claiming that it was genetically modified. Similar cases occurred in 
2003 and 2004. In these latter cases, the inspection standards were much more rigid than 
the established international standards. According to some estimates, as a result of this 
Chinese policy, the total Brazilian loss could be as high as $1 billion.100 The opening of 
economic relations has also impacted the political relationship between Brazil and 
China.101 According to Brazil, China has failed to respect its commitments to invest huge 
amounts of money in Brazil. Also, they have not supported Brazil’s demand for a 
permanent position in the United Nations’ Security Council. However, China has reacted 
by saying that they have supported Brazilian membership and will do so though they 
have a set a higher priority for Japanese membership. 
So, if relations are to progress between the two evolving giants, the problems in 
their bilateral relationship need to be addressed by both countries. Brazil needs to develop 
its export product basket further and promote products that are of higher technological 
content. They can also use some protective measures to diversify their exports. In the 
political field, Brazil can seek further cooperation from China in a number of multilateral  
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organizations including the World Bank and the IMF. Therefore, looking at the past and 
present situations, it can be concluded that the Sino-Brazilian relationship will last for a 
long time. 102 
C. WAYS AHEAD: LONG TERM AND SHORT TERM 
1. For Brazil 
In the short run, Brazil has achieved considerable power as one of the most 
important emerging economies in the world. Brazil’s strategic partnership with China, a 
result of the increased flow of trade, is a significant reason behind Brazil’s ascent to 
power. Brazil needs China’s help to enhance its global position as well as assume its role 
as a Latin American leader. China has provided a huge market for Brazilian raw 
materials, while Chinese investment in the country has helped Brazil to develop 
economically. As a fast-growing economy, China has also provided a lucrative 
destination for Brazilian foreign investment. The exchange of science and technology has 
also benefited Brazil. Therefore, in the short run, Brazil has gained economically and 
politically from its relationship with China. Though there have been some issues between 
the two countries, they seem to be manageable. 
However, in the long run, there are certain structural issues that can pose 
problems for the Brazilian economy. First, Brazil may experience a period of high growth 
due to its huge natural resources. However, historically, high growth periods in Latin 
America have been followed by economic slowdowns owing to foreign competition or 
global shocks. A drop in the price of minerals can hamper Brazil’s relationship with 
China. Moreover, though China has a huge demand for raw materials, it is also looking to 
African countries as well as other BRIC countries, like Russia, to satisfy them. Therefore, 
there is always a lurking competition present for Brazil.  
Second, the Brazilian export basket is limited and the country has specialized in a 
small number of goods. Beyond that, many of the manufactured Brazilian goods have 
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faced competition from cheap Chinese products in the third markets, limiting both the 
growth prospects of this sector and the possibility of becoming competitive in the world 
market. Therefore, for a long term relationship, Brazil needs to take care of these 
issues.103 
2. For China 
China has benefited in its relationship with Brazil as shown in Figure  9. Brazil 
has been an emerging country and it is located in the backyard of the United States. 
Chinese foreign policy has been partially successful to gain the support of Brazilian 
government against the United States.  
 
Figure 9.   GALLUP POLL: Asian opinion on China’s Future as Superpower.  
(From http://www.gallup.com/poll, 2010) 
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Apart from that, Brazil has also served as a huge reserve for natural resources that 
are required for the development of China’s industrial economy. Moreover, soybeans and 
soy oils from Brazil have also helped China meet its growing demand for food as a result 
of its population growth. The most important feature of the Sino-Latin relationship has 
been that China has conducted the relationship under very favorable conditions. Except 
for some safeguarding measures, China has had a smooth relationship with Brazil. In the 
long run, the huge Chinese demand for raw materials will surely force China to look 
elsewhere other than Latin America and Brazil. However, given Brazil’s vast amounts of 
natural resources and expertise in producing traditional goods, Brazil will continue to be 
an important economic partner for China. Moreover, China has a huge productive 
advantage given the country’s cheap labor and vast foreign reserves that will help Beijing 
keep the value of their currency lower than the Brazilian currency. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that, even in the long run, China could lose its competitive advantage to Brazil in 
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